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knowledge will never be told. Were one to master the accumulated knowledge of all the ages, yet would one not be certain that he had absolute and final knowledge of any person or of any thing. So varied and infinite is nature in all her ways.

One object of this study has been to try to show that every age must make its own contribution to the sum total of human knowledge and understanding, and that the serious contribution made by any age must be considered by succeeding ages as a serious and valuable effort, and not a contribution to be held up to scorn and cited as an example of impotence. The ancients are entitled to a serious and sympathetic consideration from us such as we should desire for ourselves in the minds of the ages yet to come.

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### REVIEWS

"Know Thyself" in Greek and Latin Literature. By Eliza Gregory Wilkins. Private Edition. Distributed by The University of Chicago Libraries (1917). 106 pages.

This University of Chicago dissertation appears in a scholarly and methodical form. It has a Table of Contents; a short Preface, in which the writer explains the aim of her study, and acknowledges her indebtedness to Professor Shorey; ten chapters, dealing with the various phases of the theme (1-99); a list of passages in Greek and in Latin authors, cited in chronological order for each language, first the passages in which there is an explicit reference to the maxim—either by exact quotation of the words or by other unmistakable language—and, secondly, the passages in which the reference is "apparent, though more or less indirectly expressed"; and a Bibliography, evidently of only the most important works, however (105-106).

The various chapters have these headings:

I, Introduction (1-11); II, "Know Thyself"<sup>1</sup> as Know your Measure (12-22); III, "Know Thyself" as Know what you Can and Cannot Do (23-32); IV, "Know Thyself" as Know your Place. Its Relation to ΣΩΦΡΟΣΥΝΗ (33-40); V, "Know Thyself" as Know the Limits of your Wisdom (41-45); VI, "Know Thyself" as Know your own Faults (46-51); VII, "Know Thyself" as Know you are Human and Mortal (52-59); VIII, "Know Thyself" as Know your own Soul (60-77); IX, "Know Thyself" is Difficult; How Attained (78-88); X, "Know Thyself" in Early Ecclesiastical Literature (89-99).

After looking at these headings, or, surely, after a slight consideration of the subject, a critic will probably find two queries coming to his mind: (1) Will there not, in the nature of things, be a different connotation of the words of this maxim in the mind of the physicist and of the philosopher, of the laity and of the priesthood, of the pagan and of the Christian?; (2) and—what might seem almost contradictory to the view just

expressed—is it possible to pigeon-hole, so exactly as is implied by the chapter headings, the meaning of the maxim in each particular passage?

Chapter I, containing the Introduction, is concerned with the various apophthegms of the Seven Sages, as they appeared on the Delphic temple. The writer, however, does not here follow the wisest plan, in the judgment of the reviewer. She should either have confined herself to her narrower subject, "Know Thyself", or have treated all the maxims. As a fact, however, she gives a brief glance at the others, but, before dwelling on her special maxim, focuses her gaze for a bit on the meaning of the puzzle *E*. Apparently she feels the inconsistency of her position, for she says (2), in what seems almost an apology for her treatment of this particular saying,

Modern discussion of the inscriptions at Delphi is concerned chiefly with the meaning of the *E* and with the arrangement of the sayings. . . .

She gives the various solutions that have been offered with regard to this puzzle. As to the date of the appearance of these sayings at Delphi, the writer does not express herself decisively. She says (6)

they must have been on the temple built toward the end of the 6th, or early in the 5th, century to replace the old stone structure destroyed by fire in 548 B. C., and it is possible, if not probable, that they were on the earlier temple of stone.

She comes to no conclusion as to whether, as Roscher believes, the sayings "originated at Delphi and had only a local application" or were inscribed at Delphi after they had been formulated. After referring to Roscher's theory, she says (8),

But the ancient theory that they appeared at Delphi only after they had become current proverbs is at least equally plausible.

The last part of the Introduction is concerned with showing the extent to which the particular maxim, "Know Thyself", was discussed in ancient times and the comparatively small number of long discussions that have survived to our day, though the shorter discussions and the references are so numerous.

In Chapter II, Miss Wilkins begins to discuss the separate passages in which the maxim occurs. It is found first in a fragment attributed to Heraclitus (Stobaeus, *Florilegium* 5.119). However, it is in Aeschylus, *Prometheus* 309-310, that we find the first example of its use where the context gives the meaning. Oceanus is giving advice to Prometheus. Of this passage the writer says (13):

Obviously Oceanus' plea is that Prometheus may humble his pride and adopt manners becoming a subject god. To know himself is to know his place as subject of the new king, to recognize his limitations in his inability to defy Zeus save to his own hurt. And these meanings of γνῶθι σαυτόν, together with the more general idea of knowing the measure of one's capacity, were undoubtedly the usual connotations of the maxim, as we shall see from our further study.

<sup>1</sup>In the dissertation we have each time, in the chapter-title, the Greek words.

The reviewer assents to this interpretation and to these statements. But do not these very statements make some of the pigeon-holes—at least the next one—unnecessary?

In Chapter III, the writer gives as the first illustration Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 4.2, a passage in which Euthydemus and Socrates are conversing. The subject of the discussion is the "Know Thyself" seen at Delphi. Socrates says to Euthydemus

. . . those who do not know themselves, and are deceived about their own ability, are in like case with regard to other men and other human affairs; they do not know what they need nor what they are doing nor what they are using, but, mistaken in all things, they miss the good and fall upon evil. . . . You see this, too, in the case of States—that those which go to war with a stronger power, ignorant of their own inability, are laid waste or lose their freedom.

Does not this sentiment represent exactly what Oceanus had in mind when he gave his advice to Prometheus? In other words, why should not the Prometheus passage be pigeon-holed in Chapter III as well as in Chapter II? Or, better still, why attempt to make a distinction in the meaning of these two expressions, Know your Measure and Know what you Can and Cannot Do? Miss Wilkins herself admits—at the end of Chapter III (31-32)—that these categories are after all not distinct.

Miss Wilkins begins Chapter IV by referring to the fact that in Chapter II she interpreted the advice of Oceanus to Prometheus as "warning him to know his place as a subject of the new king of the Gods". With the philosophers, however, the maxim took on a more philosophical color. It came to be identified with *σωφροσύνη*, 'humility', then with *δικαιοσύνη*, 'justice', and later still with the virtues in general.

In Chapter V the writer describes the influence exerted upon the interpretation of the maxim by the extreme modesty of Socrates, who felt that his noted wisdom consisted merely in recognizing and admitting his own ignorance. So several passages are adduced to show that the maxim sometimes carries the implication that a man who really knows himself will realize his ignorance.

In Chapter VI we have once more the philosopher's point of view. It is again Know your Measure or Know what you Can and what you Cannot Do. But it is in the moral, instead of in the physical world. The writer, in noting the difficulties encountered in seeing one's own faults and the ease of seeing the faults of others, refers to the two sacks in Aesop's fable, the one on our heart and the other on our back, and she gives the pertinent references, which are especially numerous in the Latin poets.

In Chapter VII, Miss Wilkins holds that the connotation of a knowledge of oneself with the thought of the inevitableness of death probably was due "to the influence of the Stoics in their claim that the maxim was the foundation of philosophy". She notes as a proof that this connotation was "general and not merely literary" the

mosaic floor of a small tomb found west of the Appian Way at Rome, bearing the figure of a skeleton with the words *ΓΝΩΘΙ ΣΑΤΤΟΝ* written in large, bold letters underneath.

In Chapter VIII, we find ourselves plunged still deeper into the philosophical connotations of the maxim. The author of the Alcibiades I argues that the maxim bids us know the soul, which is the real self. Sometimes this is the interpretation put upon the maxim by later philosophers; sometimes it is the relation of the body and the soul that is meant. Again, as the difficulty involved in the problem of having the soul gain knowledge of itself developed in the thought of the philosophers, deeper and deeper were the investigators plunged into the depths of metaphysical abstractions.

The question considered in Chapter IX is one that a philosopher alone is likely to ask. The answer is likely to be given from the philosopher's point of view. It is only the wise man—the philosopher—that can attain unto self-knowledge and "even for him perfect self-knowledge was unattainable, for it is God alone who fully knows Himself". The Stoics felt that a man could not know himself without knowing the Universe, and that meant that "the way to know oneself is to know God".

In Chapter X, it appears that comparatively few direct allusions to this maxim are found in the early Church Fathers. Clement says that this and the other apophthegms were borrowed by the Greeks from the Hebrews; that the maxim "was taken from the passage 'Thou hast seen thy brother, thou hast seen thy God' ". But this passage, as Miss Wilkins says, is not in the Bible. The connotation among these Christians was, as we might expect, different from that felt by the pagans. They added to the pagan idea of the mortality of the body the Christian doctrine of the immortality of the soul.

The passages referred to by the writer include (1) explicit references, in Greek authors, nearly 100, in Latin authors, about 25; (2) references more or less veiled, in Greek authors, nearly 50, in Latin authors, about 15; "Further Passages Touching Self-Knowledge in the Church Fathers", in Greek ecclesiastical writers, about 25, in Latin ecclesiastical writers, about 50.

Apart from the strictures that have been suggested, the work seems very well done. As the reviewer has already intimated, so many subdivisions of the subject seem neither wise nor warranted even; and the connotations are often due to the character of the man quoting the maxim or referring to it.

The reviewer has noticed only two words misspelled in the English of the text, "Peloponnesian" (15) and "Sardanapulus" (54). The Greek, however, was not very carefully read—by writer or proof-reader. There are more than 30 mistakes in breathing and accent, about equally divided between the body of the text and the footnotes.

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